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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT- CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT-STATE DEATH PENALTY STATUTES-PROCEDURAL SAFE-
GUARDS-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
Alabama death penalty statute which prohibited a jury instruction of
lesser included offenses in a capital case is unconstitutional because it
diminishes the reliability of the guilt determination process, leading to
an arbitrary and irrational imposition of the death penalty.
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
In June, 1977, Gilbert Franklin Beck was convicted in an Alabama
circuit court for the capital offense of intentional murder committed
during the course of a robbery, and sentenced to death under the
Alabama death penalty statute.' At trial, Beck testified on his own
behalf that he and an accomplice went to the home of an eighty-year-
old man to rob him, but that during the robbery his accomplice unex-
pectedly struck and killed the victim with a knife.' The defendant ad-
mitted his intent to rob, but not to murder the victim.3 The state con-
ceded that, absent a statutory prohibition, this testimony would have
entitled Beck to a lesser included offense instruction on felony
murder.' However, the Alabama death penalty statute prevented a
jury instruction which would have allowed a conviction for the lesser
included offense of felony murder.' On automatic appeal to the
1. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 630 (1980). The Alabama death penalty statute,
ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(a) (1975), provides in pertinent part:
If the jury finds the defendant guilty, it shall fix the punishment at death when
the defendant is charged by indictment with any of the following offenses and with
aggravation, which must also be averred in the indictment, and which offenses so
charged with said aggravation shall not include any lesser offenses.
The statute lists fourteen capital offenses. Beck was convicted of "[r]obbery or attempts
thereof when the victim is intentionally killed by the defendant." 447 U.S. at 627. See
ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(a)(2) (1975).
2. Beck v. State, 365 So. 2d 985, 995 (Ala. Crim. App.), affd, 365 So. 2d 1006 (Ala.
1978), rev'd, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
3. Id
4. 447 U.S. at 630. Noncapital defendants in Alabama are entitled to a lesser includ-
ed offense instruction if reasonably supported by the evidence. Id at 630 n.5 (citing
Fulghum v. State, 291 Ala. 71, 76, 277 So. 2d 886, 890 (1973)). Under this standard the par-
ties agreed that petitioner would have been entitled to lesser included offense instruc-
tions, but disagreed on the extent of such instructions. 447 U.S. at 630 n.5.
5. See note 1 supra. According to the Beck majority, the Alabama Supreme Court
has consistently construed § 13-11-2(a) to preclude a jury instruction of lesser included of-
fenses in a capital case. 447 U.S. at 628-29 n.3 (citing Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640, 646
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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 6 the verdict and sentence were af-
firmed.' Likewise, after granting certiorari, the Alabama Supreme
Court affirmed the verdict and sentence
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
reversed both the verdict and sentence." The Court held that a
sentence of death may not be constitutionally imposed after a jury ver-
dict of guilt for a capital offense when the jury is not permitted to con-
sider guilt for a lesser included noncapital offense which is warranted
by the evidence.
(Ala. 1978) (Torbert, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1122 (1979)). Thus, the Alabama statute allows the jury only the choice of convicting a
defendant of the capital crime for which he is charged, or alternatively, acquitting him
and thereby allowing a defendant to go unpunished for any participation in the crime. In
Beck the trial judge instructed the jury that if they acquitted Beck he "must be discharg-
ed" and that "he can never be tried for anything he ever did to [the victim]." 447 U.S. at
630.
6. ALA. CODE § 13-11-5 (1975) provides that a conviction and sentence of the death
penalty shall be subject to automatic review. See also ALA. CODE § 12-22-150 (1975) (trial
judge has a duty in a capital case to enter an appeal immediately after the imposition of
the death penalty which has the effect of automatically staying execution of the sentence).
7. Beck v. State, 365 So. 2d 985, 1005 (Ala. Grim. App.), aff'd, 365 So. 2d 1006 (Ala.
1978), rev'd, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
prohibition of lesser included offense instructions renders the Alabama statute constitu-
tionally indistinguishable from the mandatory death penalty statutes struck down in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976). The court maintained that the jury's only function is to determine guilt or in-
nocence, and found that the death sentence which the jury is required to impose after a
finding of guilt is merely advisory because the trial judge is the actual sentencing authori-
ty. 447 U.S. at 630-32. See ALA. CODE § 13-11-4 (1975).
8. Beck v. State, 365 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Ala. 1978), rev'd, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). In its
brief opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court relied on Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640 (Ala.
1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979), in which the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Alabama death penalty statute against a similar challenge. In the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Beck, Justice Stevens noted that the Alabama
Supreme Court only referred to certain state constitutional issues raised by the petitioner
Beck. According to Justice Stevens, the United States Supreme Court is not prevented
from deciding the federal constitutional issues which were not recognized by the Alabama
court. He noted that as long as the petitioner presented his claims in some fashion before
the Alabama Supreme Court the issues are sufficiently preserved for decision in the
United States Supreme Court. In addition, Justice Stevens pointed out that Alabama did
not challenge the Court's jurisdiction in its brief in opposition to the petition for cer-
tiorari. Although Justice Stevens also noted that the parties cannot by their actions con-
fer jurisdiction on the Court, he concluded that the technicality should not be dispositive,
especially when the death penalty was imposed in a plainly unconstitutional manner. 447
U.S. at 630-31 n.6. Justice Rehnquist took the opposite view in his dissenting opinion in
Beck. Id. at 646 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
9. 444 U.S. 897 (1979).
10. 447 U.S. at 646.
11. Id. at 627.
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The petitioner contended that the prohibition of lesser included of-
fense instructions in capital cases violates both the eighth amendment 2
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3 by substan-
tially increasing the risk of error in the fact-finding process. He argued
that in a case in which a defendant is clearly guilty of a serious non-
capital crime such as felony murder, forcing the jury to choose be-
tween conviction on the capital offense and acquittal creates the
danger that the jury will resolve any doubts in favor of conviction."
Alabama argued that the prohibition of lesser included offense in-
structions does not impair the reliability of the fact-finding process or
prejudice the defendant in any way. Rather, Alabama contended that
the jury will be more prone to acquit in a doubtful case, and where the
jury has doubts but is unwilling to acquit, the jury's ability to force a
mistrial is a viable third option. In addition, the state contended that
the prohibition of lesser included offense instructions is a reasonable
way of assuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily and
capriciously as a result of compromise verdicts. Finally, Alabama
argued that any error in the jury's imposition of the death penalty can
be cured by the judge in a hearing on aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances. 5
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens" noted that
at common law the jury was permitted to find a defendant guilty of
any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.
Although the rule originally developed as an aid to the prosecution
when the proof failed to establish some element of the crime charged,
the majority recognized that it can also be beneficial to the defendant
because it gives the jury a less drastic alternative than conviction of
the offense charged." Although the Court recognized that in a criminal
proceeding a defendant is not entitled to a lesser included offense in-
struction as a matter of constitutional due process, the majority con-
cluded that it is an important procedural safeguard both widely and
12. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VHI.
13. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
14. 447 U.S. at 632.
15. Id. at 633.
16. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell joined
in the majority opinion. Justice Brennan filed a separate concurrence. Justice Marshall
concurred only in the judgment of the Court and filed a separate opinion. Justice Rehn-
quist dissented and filed an opinion joined in by Justice White.
17. 447 U.S. at 633. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973).
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firmly established."8 The Court stated that disallowing the jury to con-
vict for a lesser included offense in a capital case creates the danger of
an unwarranted conviction which cannot be tolerated in a case in
which the defendant's life is at stake.19 The Court noted that because
there is a significant difference between the death penalty and lesser
punishments, any decision to impose the death sentence must be based
on reason rather than on caprice or emotion." Thus, according to the
Court, procedural rules that tend to diminish the reliability of the guilt
determination, as well as the sentencing determination, must be in-
validated.2
Justice Stevens rejected Alabama's contention that the prohibition
of lesser included offense jury instructions in a capital case enhances
rather than diminishes the reliability of the guilt determination pro-
cess.' He noted that Alabama has misread the Court's prior cases
striking down mandatory death penalty statutes. Justice Stevens
stated that in Furman v. Georgia23 the state's death penalty statute
was held unconstitutional because it vested the jury with complete and
unguided discretion in the imposition of capital punishment.24 In Wood-
son v. North Carolina2 5 the state's attempt to withdraw all discretion
from the jury by making the death penalty automatic on a jury verdict
of guilt of a capital offense did little to prevent a jury from making its
own personal decision about whether a defendant should be put to
death.26 The statutory defect recognized by the Court in both Furman
and Woodson is that juries might be free to acquit or convict based on
their own particular feelings of whether a specific defendant should die
for his crime. Therefore, without an established procedure to control
this unbridled discretion, the death penalty would be imposed on a
case-by-case basis in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 27 The Beck
Court maintained that Alabama's death penalty statute makes the
guilt determination depend, at least in part, on a jury's feelings about
18. 447 U.S. at 637. The Court noted that except in Alabama the federal and state
courts have unanimously held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense in-
struction where the evidence warrants it. Id. at 635-37.
19. Id at 637.
20. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (opinion of Stevens,
J.).
21. 447 U.S. at 638.
22. Id. at 639. The state argued that because the jury is led to believe that a death
sentence will be automatic upon a finding of guilt, it will be more likely to acquit than to
convict whenever it has anything approaching a reasonable doubt. Id.
23. 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
24. 447 U.S. at 639 (citing 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
25. 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
26. 447 U.S. at 639-40.
27. Id
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whether a defendant should die, without providing any standards to
guide their determination.'
Justice Stevens rejected the rationale of Jacobs v. State' in which
the Alabama Supreme Court attempted to distinguish the Alabama
death penalty statute from the North Carolina statute in Woodson.'
The court in Jacobs suggested that because juries are reluctant to ac-
quit a defendant who is clearly guilty of some serious crime, they will
be unlikely to disregard their oaths and acquit a defendant simply
because of their abhorrence of the death penalty. Rather, because the
death penalty is mandatory, the jury will be careful to accord the
defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. According
to the Jacobs court, the end result is a balance of competing emotional
pressures that ensures a reliable and rational imposition of the death
penalty. 1 The Beck majority wholly rejected this argument as
speculative and unsupported by practice.2
In its final analysis, the Court stated that Alabama's prohibition of
lesser included offense instructions in a capital case diverts the jury's
attention from the central issue of the defendant's guilt. The Court
recognized that without the option of such an instruction a defendant
may be convicted of a capital offense, even though guilty of a non-
capital offense. Conversely, a defendant may be acquitted when guilty
of a serious noncapital crime. The Court maintained that in either case,
the unavailability of a third option introduces a level of uncertainty
and unreliability into the fact-finding process that cannot be tolerated
in a capital case.'
28. Id. at 640.
29. 361 So. 2d 640, 643 (Ala. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
30. 447 U.S. at 640-41.
31. Id. The Beck Court noted that whether the preclusion of lesser included offense
instructions reduces the risk of arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty
depends on the nature of the death penalty statute. In a statute requiring that guilt be
determined separately from punishment, the risk is low that a jury will take punishment
into account in its decision of guilt. Thus, under these statutes, the preclusion of lesser in-
cluded offense instructions does not reduce the risk of arbitrariness in the imposition of
the death penalty. Only under statutes such as Alabama's where the death penalty is
mandatory after a finding of guilt, could the argument be made that the preclusion of
lesser included offense instructions reduces the risk of arbitrariness in the death penalty's
imposition. Id. at 641 n.17.
32. Id. at 641. The Court noted that the 96% conviction rate achieved by prosecutors
under the Alabama death penalty statute hardly supports the state's theory, despite the
state's argument that prosecutors only indict for capital offenses in clear cases of guilt. Id.
at 641 & n.18. The majority cited the dissent of Justice Shores in Jacobs as portraying
the more realistic view of a jury's reaction when faced with the all-or-nothing dilemma
under the Alabama death penalty statute. Id. at 642 (quoting 361 So. 2d at 651-52 (Shores,
J., dissenting)).
33. 447 U.S. at 642-43.
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The Court refuted Alabama's argument that the jury's option to
create a mistrial by refusing to return any verdict is an adequate
substitute for an instruction on lesser included offenses. 4 Similarly,
the Court was not convinced that Alabama's post-trial sentencing pro-
cedure compensates for the risk of an erroneous conviction."
Justice Brennan joined in the Court's opinion, but wrote separately
to reaffirm his belief that the death penalty is, in all circumstances,
contrary to the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments." Justice Marshall concurred only in the judgment of the
Court, stating that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.' He agreed with
the Court that the prohibition of lesser included offenses in a capital
case is unconstitutional because it substantially increases the risk of
error in the fact-finding process, but refused to join in the Court's
underlying assumption that the death penalty may ever be imposed
without violating the eighth amendment.'
Writing in dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White,
asserted that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case because
the issues before the Court were not raised in the Alabama Supreme
Court. 9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), 0 the United States Supreme Court
34. Id at 643-45. The Court rejected the argument for three reasons. First, the jury
may not understand the full implications of a mistrial, thus having no assurance that a sec-
ond trial will end in the conviction of the defendant on a lesser included offense. Second,
by acquitting a defendant believed to be guilty of some crime other than a capital crime,
the jurors would be forced to violate their oaths to acquit only in a proper case. Finally,
the traditional inclusion of lesser included offense instructions, despite the availability of
the mistrial option, indicates that such instructions provide a necessary additional
measure of protection for the defendant. Id.
35. Id. at 645-46. See ALA. CODE §§ 13-11-3, -4, -6, -7 (1975). The Court concluded that
if a fully instructed jury would find the defendant guilty only of a lesser, noncapital of-
fense the judge would not have the opportunity to impose the death sentence. Further,
the Court noted that a judge ordinarily conforms his sentence to the sentence previously
imposed by the jury. 447 U.S. at 645 & n.22.
36. 447 U.S. at 646 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
37. 447 U.S. at 646. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
38. 447 U.S. at 646 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 621 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)).
39. 447 U.S. at 646 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the
Alabama Supreme Court stated that petitioner Beck raisea only one issue in that court.
That issue dealt with a question of state constitutional law -nd was unrelated to issues
raised by the petitioner in the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 647. See note 8 supra.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) provides in relevant part:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(3) By writ of certiorari . . . where the validity of a State statute is drawn in
Vol. 19:539
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can review only a final decree by the highest state court finding that a
state statute violates the United States Constitution. Justice Rehn-
quist argued that because the Alabama Supreme Court, which is the
highest state court in Alabama in which a decision could be had, was
not asked by petitioner to decide the same questions raised by the
petitioner in the United States Supreme Court, the Court had no
jurisdiction to decide the case.41
The United States Supreme Court first examined the constitutionali-
ty of the death penalty in McGautha v. California.42 In cases prior to
McGautha the Court assumed that capital punishment was constitu-
tional and addressed only whether specific forms of execution were
cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment.43 The McGautha Court
did not focus on whether the death penalty was cruel and unusual
under the eighth amendment, but whether the death penalty could be
constitutionally imposed by leaving the decision to impose capital
punishment to the unguided discretion of a jury. The majority held
that standardless jury discretion in a capital case does not violate any
provision of the United States Constitution." The Court reasoned that
it would be beyond human wisdom to set standards for the death
penalty's imposition and that such matters should be left to each jury's
individual consideration. 5 Foreshadowing Furman v. Georgia," the
dissenters argued that standardless jury discretion in a capital case is
constitutionally impermissible.17  Furthermore, according to the
dissenters, standards for the imposition of capital punishment can and
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States.
Id.
41. 447 U.S. at 647 (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 582 (1969); Hulbert v.
City of Chicago, 202 U.S. 275, 280 (1906)). Justice Rehnquist adopted the Street standard
that when the highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will be
assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts,
unless the aggrieved party can affirmatively show the contrary. Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that such a showing was not made by the petitioner Beck. 447 U.S. at 647-48.
42. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The Court also decided the companion case of Crampton v.
Ohio. Id.
43. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (a second electrocution
attempt on the same person after the first failed was not cruel and unusual punishment
because a punishment is judged cruel and unusual by its method, not by the suffering
caused in its imposition); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (electrocution is a
form of execution permissible under the eighth amendment).
44. 402 U.S. at 207. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion joined in by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun.
45. Id at 208.
46. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
47. See 402 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); id, at 252 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
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should be drawn to ensure a defendant's rights under the fourteenth
amendment.48
One year later, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court fully examined the
nature and history of the death penalty in an attempt to resolve the
controversial question of its constitutionality. 4 Implicitly overruling
McGautha,° the Court held per curiam that state death penalty
statutes that provide no guidelines to control jury discretion violate
the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion.51 For the first time, a majority of the Court52 held that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty in an arbitrary manner constituted cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment as applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 3 However, the five
separate opinions that constituted the majority revealed a split in con-
stitutional reasoning that has persisted. Three of the Justices a4opted
a procedural approach to the constitutionality of the death penalty and
two argued that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se. Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White adopted the procedural approach, essen-
tially arguing that a procedure which insures a rational and non-
discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would comport with the
eighth amendment24 Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that
48. Id. at 245-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at 285-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. See generally Furman to Gregg: The Judicial and Legislative History, 22 How.
L.J. 53 (1979) (review and analysis of recent judicial and legislative history of the capital
punishment abolitionist movement in the United States) [hereinafter cited as Furman to
Gregg]; see also M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1973) (account of the 1960's and early 1970's death penalty litigation).
50. After its decision in Furman, the Court granted a petition for rehearing in
Crampton, the companion case to McGautha. See note 42 supra. The Court vacated its
decision in Crampton, because after Furman the Ohio death penalty statute was un-
constitutional. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941, 941-42 (1972).
51. 408 U.S. at 239-40.
52. The five Justices who formed the majority, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White,
and Marshall, all filed separate concurring opinions.
53. 408 U.S. at 239-40. The eighth amendment was not always considered to apply to
the states. The Court in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), held that the eighth amend-
ment did not apply to the states. However, in 1947, the Court in Louisiana v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947), assumed that the eighth amendment is applicable to the states. The
Court first expressly applied the eighth amendment to the states in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), in which it held criminal penalties for narcotic addiction to be
cruel and unusual punishment. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-78, 411-16 (1978).
54. Justice White stated: "I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is un-
constitutional per se or that there is no system of capital punishment that would comport
with the Eighth Amendment." 408 U.S. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Douglas stated:
[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty
enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused
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capital punishment is in all cases substantively unconstitutional and
should be abolished. Justice Brennan reasoned that capital punishment
is degrading to human dignity and therefore cruel and unusual.5
Justice Marshall believed the death penalty to be cruel and unusual
because it is excessive, unnecessary to achieve accepted societal aims,
and abhorrent to currently existing moral values." The four dissenting
Justices5 in Furman were united by one basic theme, deference to the
will of state legislatures. All argued that the abolition of the death
penalty is a legislative matter with which the judiciary should not in-
terfere."
The response by state legislatures to Furman varied. Primarily, the
states attempted to draft statutes which would reduce jury
discretion. 9 Litigation developed in response to the varied post-
Furman death penalty legislation. The Court again addressed the con-
if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a
suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a
more protected position.
Id at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). He wrote further, "[T]hese discretionary statutes are
unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimina-
tion is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is
implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Yet Justice Douglas believed that if a death penalty statute could remedy these prob-
lems, the statute would not be unconstitutional. Id at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart stated: "I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., con-
curring).
55. Id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 332-33 (Marshall, J., concurring).
57. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist each filed a
dissenting opinion.
58. See 408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
id. at 463-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); and id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. See Furman to Gregg, supra note 49, at 84-95 (discussion of states' responses to
Furman). Four basic statutory schemes emerged: (1) aggravating circumstances (sentencer
provided with a list of aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found before
death can be imposed), id. at 86-87; (2) aggravating-mitigating circumstances (sentencer
must determine if sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify sentence of death,
and if so whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to justify a sentence other
than death, id at 87-89; (3) quasi-mandatory statutes (capital punishment required when
aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are found: in all other cases capital punish-
ment forbidden), id. at 89-90; and (4) mandatory statutes (removes all discretion from
sentencer, requires sentence of death for those convicted of a limited number of crimes);
id- at 90-91. See Browning, The New Death Penalty Statutes: Perpetuating a Costly
Myth, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 651 (1974) (analysis of the post-Furman death penalty statutes). See
also Furman to Gregg, supra note 49, at 93-95 (post-Furman statutes dealt only with
sentencing discretion and not prosecutorial or executive discretion in the death penalty
area).
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stitutionality of the death penalty and attempted to refine Furman in
Gregg v. Georgia' and its companion cases. 1
Gregg v. Georgia was the initial judicial response to the legislative
aftermath of Furman. The Court, by a 7-2 vote, 2 upheld the Georgia
death penalty statute as constitutional under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments because it addressed the concerns of Furman."3 The
Gregg Court noted that the statute required specific jury findings as
to .the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant
before the death penalty could be imposed. That requirement, together
with state supreme court review of the proportionality of each death
sentence with sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants, was
held to be a sufficient check against the random and arbitrary imposi-
tion of the death penalty."
The Court also upheld as constitutional the respective state death
penalty statutes in Proffitt v. Florida5 and Jurek v. Texas"8 because
60. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (statute which provides for death penalty's imposition in a
bifurcated proceeding in which sentencer considers certain statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances held constitutional under eighth and fourteenth amendments).
61. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 243 (1976) (statute with bifurcated proceeding where
judge determines sentence of death by weighing enumerated circumstances and receives
advisory verdict from jury held constitutional); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(statute which provides for death sentence in bifurcated proceeding when jury finds that
defendant deliberately caused death of victim and there exists the probability that defend-
ant would commit criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society held
constitutional); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (death penalty statutes
which make capital punishment mandatory for a conviction of first degree murder held
unconstitutional); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
62. In Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek the nucleus of the majority was the plurality opin-
ions of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. In Gregg Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
which he differed with the plurality's interpretation of Furman that the imposition of the
death penalty must be fair and rational in every case. Instead, Justice White reasoned
that Furman mandated reasonable consistency in the imposition of the death penalty
which would remedy the problem of its arbitrary and irrational imposition. 428 U.S. at 222
(White, J., concurring in the judgment). See text accompanying notes 100-102 infra. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist also filed a statement concurring in the judgment in
which they expressed agreement with the reasoning of Justice White. 428 U.S. at 226
(Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also filed a statement con-
curring in the judgment, citing his dissenting opinion in Furman. I& at 227 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405-14 (1972) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)). Justices Brennan and Marshall each filed dissenting opinions. 428 U.S. at 227
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. 428 U.S. at 206-07.
64. Id
65. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
66. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). In both Proffitt and Jurek Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, citing
the reasoning of his concurring opinion in Gregg. 428 U.S. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring
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they too remedied the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.
In Proffitt the Court noted that the Florida statutory requirement giv-
ing trial judges specific and detailed guidance in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty, and the appellate review available to ensure
that the sentence comports with other sentences imposed under similar
circumstances guaranteed a fair and rational imposition of capital
punishment . 7 Similarly, in Jurek the Court noted that because the
Texas statutory capital sentencing procedure guides and focuses the
jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of
the individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose
a sentence of death, it has eliminated arbitrariness and caprice in the
death penalty's imposition. 8
However, the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina69 and Roberts v.
Louisiana70 struck down as unconstitutional the respective state death
penalty statutes because they were improper responses to Furman's
rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital
punishment.71 In Woodson the Court reasoned that because the North
Carolina statute made the death penalty mandatory upon a conviction
of first degree murder and provided no standards to guide the jury in
their determination of guilt, the decision to impose the death penalty
was left to the personal feelings of jurors. The Court noted that the
constitutional deficiencies recognized in Furman are not eliminated by
the mere formal removal of all sentencing power from juries in capital
in the judgment); 428 U.S. at 277-78 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). In both cases
Justice Blackmun filed a statement concurring in the judgment. 428 U.S. at 261
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); 428 U.S. at 279 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in both cases. 428 U.S. at 227
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. 428 U.S. at 259-60.
68. 428 U.S. at 276.
69. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
70. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
71. In Woodson and Roberts the vote was 5-4, and again the plurality of Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens formed the nucleus of the majority. In Woodson Justices
Brennan and Marshall filed statements concurring in the judgment. 428 U.S. at 305 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist, in which he again advanced his interpretation of Furman. Id. at 306 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting statement and Justice Rehnquist filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 307 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). In Roberts Justices Brennan and Marshall filed statements concurring in the judg-
ment. 428 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 336 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting statement. Id. at 337
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice White filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, and Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting
statement. Id at 337 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 363 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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cases. 2 Similarly, in Roberts the Court reasoned that, even though the
Louisiana statute had a narrower definition of capital murder than the
North Carolina statute, it still suffered from the same defects noted in
Woodson. These statutes plainly invite jurors to disregard their oaths
and convict on a lesser offense if they feel the death penalty is inap-
propriate, which, the Court noted, still invites the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death penalty condemned in Furman."3
The plurality opinions in Gregg and its companion cases adopt the
underlying assumption that capital punishment is not unconstitutional
per se, but only cruel and unusual if imposed in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner.7' Only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented
from that assumption.7 5
After Gregg the Court again examined the constitutionality of a
death penalty statute in Lockett v. Ohio. 8 In Lockett the Court held
the Ohio death penalty statute to be unconstitutional because it
precluded the sentencing authority from considering those individualized
mitigating factors required by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
The Court noted that some discretion in a death penalty statute may
not be enough to ensure the fair and rational imposition of the death
penalty.71 The Court's holding in Lockett indicated a further refine-
72. 428 U.S. at 302-03.
73. 428 U.S. at 331-36.
74. The Gregg plurality stated: "We hold that the death penalty is not a form of
punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense,
regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in
reaching the decision to impose it." 428 U.S. at 187. In reaching this conclusion the Gregg
plurality employed a normative approach to death penalty analysis. See 428 U.S. at 168.
See also text accompanying notes 83-89 infra.
75. Justices Brennan and Marshall both believe that the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional per se. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370
(Marshall, J., concurring).
76. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
77. Id at 604-08. Chief Justice Burger wrote a three part opinion. The first two
parts, which dealt with other aspects of criminal law involved in the case, constituted an
opinion of the Court joined in by Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Stevens. Id. at 588. Part three of the opinion, in which the Chief Justice adopted the
approach of the Gregg plurality to death penalty analysis, was joined in only by Justices,
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. Id at 597. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in
the first two parts of Chief Justice Burger's opinion and concurring in the judgment in
which he offered different reasons for vacating the petitioner's death sentence. Id at 613
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See text accompanying
notes 120 & 121 infra. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. 438
U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment, and concurring in part and dissenting in part from part three of
Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Id at 621 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, and concurring in the judgment). See text accompanying notes 100-104 infra. Justice
Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 438 U.S. at 628 (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan did not participate in
the decision. Id at 588.
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ment of the procedural approach advocated first in Furman and then in
Gregg.
78
Shortly before Lockett, in Coker v. Georgia9 the Court held that the
sentence of death for the crime of rape is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment forbidden by the eighth amendment as cruel and
unusual punishment.0 The difference between Coker and the other
death penalty cases is that in Coker the Court did not assume that the
death penalty for rape is per se constitutional, whereas for certain
kinds of murder the death penalty is now assumed to be constitutional
per se.81 Thus, Coker and Lockett reveal the Court's further refine-
ment of death penalty statutes to ensure that capital punishment is
only imposed for a limited class of crimes and only after the observ-
ance of rigorous procedural guidelines.82 Beck embodies the continua-
tion of this refinement process.
Two lines of death penalty analysis have emerged from Furman: the
78. See 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 317 (1979) (analysis of the refinements in Lockett and
how other previously constitutional death penalty statutes could be considered to be un-
constitutional based on the holding in Lockett). See also Black, The Death Penalty Now,
51 TUL. L. REV. 429 (1977) (detailed account of the facts in the Lockett case).
79. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
80. I& at 592-600. Justice White delivered an opinion joined in by Justices Stewart,
Blackmun, and Stevens. I&L at 586. Justices Brennan and Marshall each filed a statement
concurring in the judgment. Id at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 600
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Id at 601 (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
filed a dissenting opinion. Id at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
81. See note 74 supra.
82. In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Court by a 6-3 vote held that the
Georgia death penalty statute which provided that a person convicted of murder may be
sentenced to death if it is found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhumane in that it involved torture, depravi-
ty of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim" was unconstitutionally construed too
broadly and vaguely by the Georgia Supreme Court. Id at 432-33. In an opinion joined in
by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, Justice Stewart reaffirmed the Court's trend
toward refinement of death penalty statutes. Justice Stewart asserted that:
[I]f a state wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional respon-
sibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and
capricious infliction of the death penalty. [The state must] define the crimes for
which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates standardless [sentencing]
discretion.
Id. at 428. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 433 (Marshall, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting
opinion which sharply criticized the Court for embarking on a misguided case-by-case
analysis to tell states which of their murderers may be given the death penalty. Id. at 442
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the
ground that the Georgia Supreme Court committed no error in its review function. Id. at
447 (White, J., dissenting).
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normative approach and the analytic approach." The normative ap-
proach is derived from Weems v. United States8 and Trop v. Dulles8
in which the Court asserted that the eighth amendment is an indepen-
dent proscription against inhumane punishments." Under the nor-
mative approach, the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment is interpreted in light of the evolving standards of decency
in society." This analysis was adopted by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall in Furman when they maintained that the death penalty is cruel
and unusual per se under the eighth amendment,88 and was also
adopted by a plurality of the Court in Coker when it held that the im-
position of death as punishment for the crime of rape of an adult
woman is per se cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment.8
According to the analytic approach, the eighth amendment derives
its meaning from other explicit constitutional guarantees such as due
process and equal protection." This approach requires that personal
guarantees found elsewhere in the text of the Constitution be applied
with particular exactitude when severe punishments are involved. 1
Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White adopted this approach in Fur-
man,92 recognizing that the death penalty may be imposed for certain
crimes but only in a procedurally fair and rational manner. A plurality
of the Court in Gregg also followed this analysis, holding that a state
death penalty statute must provide for guided sentencing discretion to
avoid an arbitrary and irrational imposition of the death penalty. 3 The
Court, by a plurality in Lockett, further interpreted this approach to
define how much guided sentencing discretion is necessary for a state
83. See Manheim, The Capital Punishment Cases: A Criticism of Judicial Method, 12
LoY. L.A.L. REV. 85, 87-92 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Manheim].
84. 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (Phillipine punishment of cadena temporal held cruel and
unusual under the eighth amendment).
85. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation as a punishment for wartime desertion held cruel
and unusual under the eighth amendment).
86. See Manheim, supra note 83, at 90-92.
87. Id. Chief Justice Warren, writing the plurality opinion in Trop, adopted the approach
of Weems, stating: "[T]he words of the [eighth] Amendment are not precise, and... their scope
is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." 356 U.S. at 100-01.
88. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 79 & 80 and accompanying text supra.
90. See Manheim, supra note 83, at 87. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No
State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
91. See Manheim, supra note 8, at 87.
92. See 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
93. See 428 U.S. at 189.
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death penalty statute to be constitutional.94 This analytic, or pro-
cedural, approach allows the Court to scrutinize the constitutionality of
state death penalty statutes without disturbing the basic assumption
that the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se.9 5
The Court in Beck implicitly adopted the holding in Gregg that the
death penalty is not unconstitutional per se.0 Indeed, the Courts for-
mulation of the issue on which they granted certiorari assumes the per
se constitutionality of the death penalty and only questions whether
there is a particular procedural defect in the Alabama death penalty
statute. Thus, the Beck Court followed the analytic approach, holding
that although the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se, a state
must scrupulously follow rigorous procedural guidelines in imposing
the death penalty." The Court recognized that a jury instruction on
lesser included offenses, while not a due process right, is an important
procedural safeguard that ensures a fair and rational imposition of the
death penalty.9 This is consistent with the notion underlying the
analytic approach that capital cases require more procedural protec-
tions and a stricter application of those protections.
Although the Court in Lockett and Beck has maintained that a cer-
tain amount of guided jury discretion is required to prevent an ar-
bitrary and irrational imposition of the death penalty, it is not clear
how much jury discretion would defeat this purpose and result in the
irrational and arbitrary imposition of capital punishment. Justice
White, in his separate opinion in Lockett,'00 criticized the Lockett
plurality's mandate that state death penalty statutes provide greater
individualization in the imposition of capital punishment by requiring
full consideration in each case of the factors mitigating against it."'
Justice White maintained that this approach fosters the erratic imposi-
tion of the death penalty because a jury can refuse to impose capital
punishment in any case as long as it can cite factors mitigating against
the imposition of death."2 Justice White's criticism stems from his
belief that Furman mandated that the death penalty be imposed with a
definite degree of certainty to prevent the arbitrary and irrational im-
94. See 438 U.S. at 604-08. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
95. See Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52
NOTRE DAME LAW. 261, 288-89 (1976). See also Manheim, supra note 83, at 133.
96. See note 74 supra.
97. 447 U.S. at 627.
98. See idc at 637-38.
99. Id at 637.
100. 438 U.S. at 621 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judknents).
101. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
102. 438 U.S. at 623.
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position of capital punishment caused by unlimited jury discretion."3
According to Justice White, certainty requires that capital defendants
similarly situated not be treated differently."' Because Justice White
dissented from the majority opinion in Beck on jurisdictional
grounds,"5 it is not clear whether he perceives Beck, like Lockett, as
fostering an erratic imposition of the death penalty.
The majority's approach in Beck and the plurality's approach in
Lockett reflect a different interpretation of Furman than that held by
Justice White. The plurality in Lockett adopted the Gregg plurality's
interpretation of Furman which is not primarily concerned with cer-
tainty or regularity of punishment, but rather with the fair and ra-
tional imposition of capital punishment in every case. The Lockett
plurality accepted the Gregg plurality's interpretation of Furman
which is that Furman condemned unlimited jury discretion that allows
a jury to base its decision to impose the death penalty on its own per-
sonal feelings about whether the defendant deserves to be executed. '
The Beck Court also accepted this interpretation of Furman when it
determined that Alabama's failure to allow the jury to convict a capital
defendant of a lesser included noncapital offense might cause the jury
to base its decision to impose the death penalty on its own personal
feelings. The Court revealed its concern that in each case adequate
alternatives be available to the jury to ensure that the imposition of
the death penalty is not the result of irrational decision-making in-
fluenced by personal feelings. '
Beck is the first modern death penalty case in which one opinion
was able to command a majority of the Court. Six Justices, including
Justice Brennan, joined in the Beck opinion."' In Beck the Gregg
plurality of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. The implication of this majority
can be understood only by examining the evolution of Chief Justice
Burger's and Justice Blackmun's death penalty analyses.
In Furman Chief Justice Burger dissented, ' maintaining that the
approach taken by Justices Stewart and White emphasizing the ra-
tionality of the sentencing process fundamentally misconceived the
nature of the eighth amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment. He also maintained that such an approach was without
103. See Palmer, Two Perspectives on Structuring Discretion: Justices Stewart and
White on the Death Penalty, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 194, 198-99 (1979).
104. Id.
105. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
106. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
107. 447 U.S. at 640.
108. See note 16 supra.
109. See note 57 and text accompanying notes 57 & 58 supra.
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precedent. 110 In Gregg the Chief Justice joined in the concurring opin-
ion of Justice White, agreeing with Justice White's requirement of
regularity and certainty in the imposition of the death penalty.,"
However, in part III of his Lockett opinion the Chief Justice cited the
approach of the Gregg plurality, indicating that this was the approach
to be utilized in death penalty cases."' Justice White, with whom the
Chief Justice had agreed in Gregg, dissented from the reasoning of the
Chief Justice's opinion in Lockett, reaffirming the approach he followed
in Gregg."' Immediately prior to Beck, in Godfrey v. Georgia,"' Chief
Justice Burger dissented from the plurality opinion of Justice Stewart
because he believed that the Court in Godfrey was telling the states
which of its intentional murderers may be given the death penalty."'
However, the Chief Justice did reaffirm his support of the analytic ap-
proach to death penalty analysis."'
Justice Blackmun dissented in Furman."7 Although he noted his per-
sonal opposition to the death penalty, he maintained that the Court
must defer to the states in criminal matters involving it."' In Gregg
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment of the Court, citing his
Furman dissent."" In Lockett Justice Blackmun concurred only in the
judgment of the Court, offering a different rationale for the reversal.'
He believed that the petitioner's death sentence should have been
vacated on the grounds that the Ohio death penalty statute did not
allow consideration of the extent of the petitioner's involvement in the
crime for which she was charged; and that the Ohio rule of criminal
procedural that gives the sentencing court the discretion to bar the
death penalty if defendant pleads guilty, but no such discretion if
defendant goes to trial, creates unconstitutional disparity of sentencing
110. 408 U.S. at 396-97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
111. See text accompanying note 62 supra. In addition to joining in Justice White's
opinion, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed a statement in which they con-
curred in the analysis of Justice White. 428 U.S. at 226 (Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
112. See 438 U.S. at 597-609.
113. 438 U.S. at 621 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment). See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
114. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See note 82 supra.
115. 446 U.S. at 443-44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id at 443 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice noted that the Court must
ensure that the rights of a capital defendant are scrupulously protected and that the jury
performs its sentencing task with meticulous care. Id.
117. 408 U.S. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See note 57 and text accompanying
notes 57 & 58 supra.
118. 408 U.S. at 410.
119. 428 U.S. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). See note 62 supra.
120. 438 U.S. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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procedures. '21 However, in Godfrey Justice Blackmun joined Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in the plurality opinion asserting that
death penalty statutes must be tailored and applied to avoid the ar-
bitrary and capricious imposition of death.1 "
Now, in Beck, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun have joined
in Justice Stevens' majority opinion. Thus, both of the Justices now
agree with the interpretation of Furman by the Gregg plurality which
maintains that the imposition of capital punishment be fair and rational
in every case. Only future death penalty cases will reveal the nature
and extent of the agreement between the Justices who joined in the
Beck majority opinion.
Scott T. Redman
121. Id.
122. 446 U.S. at 422. See note 82 supra.
